Sandu vs. Stoianoglo: Who will prevail in second round of presidential election?
The first round of elections in Moldova, held on October 20, left many questions unanswered. The concerns raised were less about President Maia Sandu and her team of political strategists, and more about the country’s political system. Since the collapse of the former USSR, Moldova has been navigating a delicate balance between Europe and Russia—a choice between the European democratic model and Russia’s centralized governance. A correspondent from Kazinform News Agency has analyzed the country’s political landscape and potential outcomes for the second round of the presidential election.
Unsettled governance model
Moldova’s choice of a governance model remains unclear. In domestic politics, and particularly in the eyes of the Moldovan public, both Europe and Russia are often viewed as idealized, yet seemingly unattainable concepts. This perception is especially relevant when it comes to Russia, which, in many post-Soviet countries, is still closely associated with the former USSR—a sentiment of nostalgia that is particularly strong among the older generation in Moldova.
At the same time, Europe is also seen as an ideal model, especially for the younger generation. However, implementing this model in Moldova has faced significant challenges. This was evident from the early 1990s liberalization period, during which Moldovan national liberals attempted to achieve their goals, triggering the Transnistrian War and conflict with Gagauzia.
Since then, citizens in these two regions—despite their different political statuses (Gagauzia being an autonomous region within Moldova and Transnistria an unrecognized republic)—have consistently voted against pro-European parties. In the October 20 elections, 98% of voters in Gagauzia opposed Maia Sandu, and 95% were against Moldova joining the European Union. In Transnistria, where many citizens also hold Moldovan passports, Sandu received 25.2% of the vote, while her opponent, Alexandr Stoianoglo, garnered 35.4%. However, 37.4% of Transnistrian voters supported joining the EU, a difference from Gagauzia, likely due to the EU being a significant economic partner for Transnistria.
But in any case, any elections in Moldova now take place with consideration of the consequences of the unsuccessful wave of liberalization in the early 1990s. Politicians continue to fight for both pro-European and pro-Russian voters, with the latter including nearly all of Gagauzia’s citizens and a significant portion of Transnistria’s population. Even within Moldova, there remains a persistent split between voters with fundamentally different visions for the country’s ideal governance model.
Scandals in Moldovan politics
Every election in Moldova is a battle over the country’s future, often leaving a significant portion of the population dissatisfied. Despite a competitive landscape and frequent elections, the political system remains unstable. This instability is partly due to the unique nature of political competition, which doesn’t follow the traditional left-right divide seen in most European nations. Moreover, Moldova is periodically rocked by scandals.
One of the most infamous examples was the power grab by local oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who exploited democratic processes to dominate political parties and key politicians. While oligarchic influence is common in the post-Soviet region, Moldova is notable for how a single oligarch managed to seize control through manipulation.
Another major scandal involved oligarch Ilan Shor, who was accused of embezzling €1 billion from Moldovan banks. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, and his party “Shor” was banned. In April 2024, however, Ilan Shor announced from Moscow the formation of a new political bloc called “Victory”. Just before the elections, Moldovan intelligence reported that Shor had established a network of 130,000 people with a $15 million budget for bribery. Given Moldova’s 3.3 million registered voters, of whom only 1.56 million participated, 130,000 votes represent 8%—a substantial margin for potential electoral manipulation.
Referendum on EU integration
Any Moldovan election is practically a battleground, often decided by a few thousand votes. For instance, in a recent referendum on EU integration, 50.46% voted in favor, while 49.54% opposed—an extremely close result that leaves the situation uncertain. Effectively, half of the population is against EU membership.
This narrow result highlights the impact of political tactics used by both sides. In Russia, only two polling stations were opened, with a total of 10,000 ballots, despite Russian authorities claiming there are 500,000 Moldovan citizens in Russia—a figure dating back to 2014. Since then, the number has decreased, as many Moldovans have opted to work in Europe, attracted by the visa-free regime and ongoing political uncertainty.
Over 200 polling stations were opened across Europe, playing a crucial role in the EU integration referendum. Seventy-seven percent of Moldovans abroad voted for EU membership. However, in regions like Gagauzia, many Sandu opponents participated in the presidential vote but refused ballots in the referendum, leading to half a million fewer participants in the referendum than in the presidential election.
A Pyrrhic victory?
Although this victory can be considered a “Pyrrhic” one. Long ago, King Pyrrhus of Epirus defeated the Romans—the distant ancestors of the Moldovans—but suffered enormous losses in the process. In the end, he was forced to withdraw from Italy. Since then, a victory that may lead to eventual defeat is called a “Pyrrhic victory”.
Sandu or Stoianoglo?
The upcoming second round on November 3 presents a more complex challenge. Sandu holds 42.45% of the vote, while Stoianoglo has 25.98%. Other candidates have aligned against the current president. Renowned politician Renato Usatîi, who received 13.79%, announced he would not endorse Sandu. Former Gagauzia head Irina Vlah, who got 5.38%, and her voters are generally against Sandu and European integration. Victoria Furtună, with 4.45%, is linked to Shor, though she denies it.
Mathematically, if all their votes go to Stoianoglo, he has a chance of winning on November 3. However, this depends on multiple factors. While Stoianoglo can likely count on Vlah’s voters due to shared Gagauz ethnicity, other groups remain uncertain.
Stoianoglo, a former prosecutor general who clashed with Sandu and faced corruption accusations, was suspended in 2023. He is backed by the pro-Russian Socialist Party and its leader, former President Igor Dodon, who refers to Stoianoglo as a “people’s candidate”. Although Stoianoglo denies any connection to Russia, his platform appeals to pro-Russian voters, advocating for dialogue with Russia to secure market access and energy resources.
The second round of elections on November 3 will once again bring together supporters of two opposing visions for Moldova’s future. Sandu is likely to have the upper hand, as her ideological opponents were already energized in the first round. If Stoianoglo appears to have a chance, pro-European voters are expected to rally in the second round.
The ethnic factor could also influence the outcome—some ethnic Moldovans may vote for Stoianoglo in protest, but it’s unclear if these protest votes will be enough in the second round. In neighboring Romania, an ethnic German, Klaus Iohannis, became president, but it’s uncertain if Moldovan voters are ready for a similar decision. Moldova’s identity debate, ongoing since the 1990s, adds complexity, particularly since seven of the eleven presidential candidates in this election hold Romanian citizenship, including President Sandu.
In conclusion, Sandu is still the likely winner, even though she hasn’t fully met voter expectations. Even if Stoianoglo were to win, a significant return to the era of President Dodon is unlikely. Moldova’s political landscape—both internally and externally—has evolved too much for a complete reversal. In essence, Moldova’s path towards EU integration seems inevitable, though a Stoianoglo victory might slow the journey. The political struggle between Moldova’s two main factions will continue, but the momentum appears to be gradually shifting towards the pro-European side, driven by external factors and demographic changes, as the older generation’s nostalgia for the USSR slowly diminishes.